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In re Estate of Bethurem, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 92 (Nov. 27, 2013)1
WILLS & ESTATES: UNDUE INFLUENCE
Summary
The Court determined one issue: (1) whether, in the absence of a presumption of undue
influence, a will contestant bears the burden of proving undue influence by a preponderance of
the evidence.
Disposition
Yes, absent a presumption of undue influence, a will contestant bears the burden of
proving undue influence by a preponderance of the evidence.
Factual and Procedural History
Respondents Anita Herrera Perez (“Anita”) and Sandra Kurtz (“Sandra”) challenged the
validity of their stepfather’s will, claiming undue influence from appellant, their Aunt Ines
Careveo (“Ines”). In 2004, respondents’ stepfather, Arlan Bethurem (“Arlan”), executed a will
bequeathing his estate to his wife Bertha. If Bertha did not survive him, Arlan’s will divided his
estate equally between his three stepchildren and a granddaughter. In 2005, Bertha became ill
and Arlan needed assistance with her care. Ines came from Texas to help care for Bertha. Ines
asked Sandra and Anita to assist with Bertha’s care, but neither could do so. Ines was angry with
Sandra and Anita for failing to care for Bertha.
Bertha passed away in May 2006. Ines helped Arlan to make funeral arrangements with a
priest. The priest testified that Arlan was lucid at the meeting, but expressed disappointment in
Sandra and Anita for not being more supportive during Bertha’s illness. After the funeral, Arlan
spoke with Ines daily via telephone. However, Arlan did not speak with Sandra for several
months or to Anita for more than a year. In the meantime, Arlan continued to go to work and to
provide for his own daily needs.
In 2007, Arlan had his friend and accountant Vicki Preston (“Preston”) prepare a new
will for him, which changed the beneficiaries to Ines and Arlan’s sister and disinherited his
stepchildren. Preston testified that Arlan appeared in good mental condition. Further, Preston and
her friend, who served as a witness to the will, testified that Arlan expressed disappointment that
Sandra and Anita had not helped care for Bertha. Arlan also conveyed title of his home to
himself and Ines as joint tenants with right of survivorship. Additionally, he added Ines to some
of his bank accounts.
Arlan lost his job in October 2008. He put his house up for sale and moved to Oregon to
be with Sandra. Arlan expressed regret to Sandra about changing his will. Sandra testified that
Arlan had a history of changing his will when he was angry with family members. Arlan named
Sandra and Ines as beneficiaries to a savings account worth $84,000.
Two months later, Arlan committed suicide. Preston was appointed special administrator
of Arlan’s estate. Because Arlan’s home was in escrow at the time, Ines received the sale
proceeds. Ines and Sandra received equal shares of his $84,000 savings account. Preston
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petitioned to distribute the rest of the according to the 2007 will. Sandra and Anita opposed the
petition, claiming Ines had unduly influenced Arlan.
The probate commissioner recommended that the 2004 will be admitted for probate,
finding that Ines had unduly influenced Arlan “by mount[ing] a campaign to turn Bertha and
Arlan against Bertha’s daughters.” Although the District Court found some of the probate
commissioner’s assumptions unsupported by evidence, it reasoned these were harmless errors.
Consequently, the District Court affirmed the probate commissioner’s recommendation.
Discussion
To establish undue influence in Nevada, “it must appear, either directly or by justifiable
inference from the facts proved, that the influence . . . destroy[ed] the free agency of the
testator.”2 Further, “[a] presumption of undue influence arises when a fiduciary relationship
exists and the fiduciary benefits from the questioned transaction.”3 However, undue influence
may also be shown in the absence of a presumption.4 The appropriate burden and quantum of
proof required to establish undue influence in the absence of a presumption is an issue of first
impression for this Court.
Burden and quantum of proof for establishing undue influence
A majority of other jurisdictions require undue influence be proved only by a
preponderance of the evidence. Additionally, the Court has used a preponderance standard for
proving undue influence in cases involving testamentary transfers. Consequently, “in the absence
of a presumption, a will contestant must establish the existence of undue influence by a
preponderance of the evidence.” To meet this standard, “the contestant must show that the
disposition of property under the will was ‘more likely than not’ the result of undue influence.”5
This approach provides the best protections to vulnerable alleged donors because it makes it
easier for will contestants to establish undue influence.
Substantial evidence did not support the district court’s order
Neither the probate court nor the district court identified the evidence that supported the
probate commissioner’s finding of undue influence. “[T]he fact that Ines may have possessed
influence does not amount to undue influence unless her influence destroyed Arlan’s free
agency.” As there is no other evidence indicating Arlan changed his will due to any undue
influence, the district court’s order affirming the probate court was not supported by substantial
evidence.
Conclusion
The Court reversed the district court’s order invalidating the will as a product of undue
influence because the respondents failed to meet the requisite burden of proof.
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